Dr Walter C. Ladwig III analyses Operation Sindoor and its impact on regional deterrence dynamics.
NEW DELHI: In an exclusive interaction with The Sunday Guardian, leading South Asia security expert Dr Walter C. Ladwig III offered an incisive assessment of Operation Sindoor, India’s limited but impactful military campaign launched in the wake of the April Pahalgam attack.
Dismissing suggestions that India halted the operation prematurely, Ladwig framed the decision as a deliberate exercise in strategic restraint—one that demonstrated India’s ability to deliver calibrated military responses without escalating into full-scale conflict.
Ladwig, who is a senior Lecturer in International Relations at King’s College London and an Associate Fellow at Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), the world’s oldest and the UK’s leading defence and security think tank noted that Operation Sindoor may well reshape assumptions about limited war between nuclear-armed adversaries.
Q: Many believe India halted Operation Sindoor too soon, despite having the upper hand. What is your view?
A: As I understand it, the primary objective of Operation Sindoor was not to provoke a general conflict with Pakistan, but to degrade terrorist infrastructure linked to the Pahalgam attack. From that standpoint, the Indian military executed its orders with precision—striking key targets with a measured scope and avoiding broader escalation.
While there were subsequent rounds of reciprocal strikes on military infrastructure, these appear to have been limited in scale and calibrated by both sides. The decision to conclude the operation once core objectives were met reflects strategic discipline, not missed opportunity. India demonstrated both capability and resolve, but without escalating the crisis beyond what was required to reestablish deterrence.
To be fair, it also appears that Pakistan—despite rhetorical posturing—sought to avoid a wider war. Both sides signalled a desire to manage escalation, and the ceasefire reflects mutual interest in restoring stability after a sharp but contained confrontation. In that light, halting the operation when it did was not a failure of nerve, but a deliberate choice consistent with strategic restraint.
Q: Has Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent strategy—often labelled “nuclear blackmail”—finally been tested and neutralised in this conflict? How might that reshape future regional calculations?
A: Operation Sindoor adds a new case to the evolving debate about whether nuclear weapons deter conventional conflict. In theory, Pakistan’s nuclear posture—including its ambiguity about thresholds—was designed to prevent precisely this kind of Indian retaliation. Yet India not only conducted limited air and missile strikes on terrorist infrastructure, it also targeted military facilities, all while staying below the threshold of uncontrolled escalation.
What this episode demonstrates is that there may be more space for limited conventional conflict between nuclear-armed states than previously assumed. The operation proceeded without overt nuclear signalling from either side, suggesting that both governments were invested in managing escalation. That in itself is a notable development.
Importantly, this is new terrain. We have limited historical precedent for two nuclear-armed states engaging in direct, sustained conventional exchanges. While we have many examples of nuclear-armed states being targeted by non-nuclear actors, reciprocal action at this level between two nuclear powers is unusual. Operation Sindoor thus represents a live test of strategic assumptions—and one that will likely inform future calculations in South Asia and beyond.
Q: Compared to past conflicts like Kargil or the Balakot strikes, what made Operation Sindoor distinct in terms of objectives, execution, and international engagement?
A: What distinguishes Operation Sindoor is not only its scale and precision, but its unprecedented reach in the post-1998 nuclear era. During the Kargil conflict, the Indian Air Force went to great lengths not to cross the Line of Control—even accidentally—while striking Pakistani positions on Indian territory. That caution reflected deep concern about escalation.
The 2019 Balakot strike was seen as a watershed moment precisely because it marked India’s first airstrike into Pakistan proper in decades—but it was limited, both in scope and in geography, falling just across the border into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
In contrast, Operation Sindoor involved multiple rounds of strikes, including inside the Punjabi heartland of Pakistan which has symbolic and strategic significance. Follow-on targeting of several Pakistani air-bases further underscored the doctrinal shift. An Indian air campaign of this breadth and depth has not been seen since the 1971 war.
In terms of execution, the operation also reflected a high degree of jointness and technological maturity. We also see military action was integrated with economic pressure (i.e. Indus Waters Treaty).
Q: What impact did Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s leadership and the foreign policies followed by him in the last one decade have on India’s confidence and manoeuvering during this operation?
A: Over the past decade, Indian responses to major terrorist attacks have followed a clear pattern of increasing operational assertiveness. In 2016, India conducted the so-called “surgical strikes” across the Line of Control. In 2019, it carried out airstrikes on Balakot in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. In 2025, Operation Sindoor marked a further step in this progression—employing expanded airpower, drones, loitering munitions, and other precision-strike assets.
Each of these actions reflected an effort to demonstrate resolve while keeping operations calibrated and bounded. Despite expanded military reach, Indian responses have remained below the threshold of general war. Notably, while certain segments of the domestic media often engage in hyperbole, government messaging—particularly in English—has tended to emphasise control, legitimacy, and proportionality.
This trajectory aligns with broader policy shifts over the past decade, including a more assertive posture on counterterrorism and a reduced willingness to absorb cross-border attacks without visible retaliation. Operation Sindoor should be viewed within this continuum: an evolution of practice rather than a break from precedent—forceful but limited, and part of an increasingly routinised strategic logic.
Q: How did India’s key allies—such as the US, France, and Australia—respond to Operation Sindoor behind the scenes? Do you see a shift toward more overt strategic support for India in a crisis with Pakistan?
A: Many of India’s strategic partners initially expressed solidarity following the Pahalgam terror attack, condemning terrorism and affirming India’s right to self-defence. Once military operations were underway, they publicly struck a more cautious tone, but behind closed doors, many conveyed understanding, if not tacit approval. The United States focused on preventing escalation, but its messages to Delhi were notably restrained. France, as India’s key defence partner, emphasised the legitimacy of counterterrorism operations. Australia echoed the need for stability but avoided any moral equivalence. There’s a growing consensus in the West that India has a right to defend itself—especially when its actions are precise and bounded. That, too, reflects India’s rising stature in global crisis diplomacy.
Some voices in the policy and media space have expressed frustration that no partner country offered unequivocal public backing for India’s actions. However, it’s worth noting that the Indian government does not appear to have issued any clear diplomatic “asks” beyond calls to persuade Pakistan to halt support for cross-border terrorism. In the absence of specific requests—whether for public endorsements, sanctions, intelligence sharing, or diplomatic pressure—partners are unlikely to act on their own initiative. Expecting concrete expressions of support without articulating desired outcomes risks conflating solidarity with policy alignment. If India seeks more overt strategic backing in future crises, it may need to be more explicit about what forms that support should take.